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ABSTRACT
This article examines the effectiveness and feasibility of some of the main
proposals for financial taxes by analysing their economic rationale and
impact and some related international trade law issues regarding their im-
plementation. The advantages and disadvantages are considered in terms of
their effect on risk mitigation, market liquidity and the provision of sustain-
able revenue. The article suggests that financial transaction taxes, especially
those applied to currency transactions and exchange-traded and
over-the-counter derivatives, could serve regulatory objectives while raising
adequate revenue to assist governments in paying for the social costs of
financial crises and providing global public goods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The costs of the financial crisis of 2007–09 are rising exponentially and will
impose huge economic and social costs on both developed and developing
countries for generations to come. The crisis has also made it extremely
difficult for developed countries to honour their pledges made at the
Gleneagles G7 Summit in 2005 to increase their financial support for
global public goods such as the United Nations (UN) Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). Governments will thus be obliged to generate
additional revenue, and to shape taxation accordingly. This article examines
the effectiveness and feasibility of several financial taxes, including a bank
balance sheet tax, a currency transaction tax (CTT) and a broader financial
transaction tax (FTT).1 The article argues that financial taxes are becoming
part of the international regulatory landscape and will eventually become an
integral component of prudential regulatory regimes. The article also sug-
gests that financial taxes can serve as innovative sources of finance to pay for
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Zu¨rich; Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Financial Analysis and Policy, The Judge
Business School, University of Cambridge. E-mail: k.alexander@jbs.cam.ac.uk
1 A financial transaction tax is a generic term covering a number of possible taxes that could
apply to certain securities investments, derivative contracts or other financial products includ-
ing commodities.
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the social costs of financial crises while also providing for global public
goods.2
Financial policymakers are debating whether and how to use financial
taxes to enhance the regulation of financial markets.3 Financial taxes can
have three main objectives: (i) to limit excessive risk-taking, (ii) to provide
an insurance or resolution fund for systemically important institutions and
(iii) to help pay for global public goods. It should be emphasized that these
three objectives are separable, both in their economic rationale and in prac-
tice. The first objective, limiting excessive risk-taking, is derived from the
desire to price risk efficiently. In this case, how the funds are used subse-
quently is not of primary concern. Second, the proposition that such funds
might be used to build an insurance fund is an entirely separate argument
related not to mitigating the riskiness of financial transactions but to pricing
accurately the implicit insurance provided to institutions deemed too big or
too inter-connected to fail. The provision of assistance to those most affected
by ill-chosen risk-taking is a third component of an efficient pricing strategy.
Hence the objective of efficient pricing may be pursued by adopting all three
goals at once, or by pursuing them separately.
II. BANK BALANCE SHEET TAXES
A. Domestic efforts
Sweden adopted a so-called ‘stability fee’ in 2009 that was a direct levy on
Swedish banks and credit institutions to provide a fund to pay for the reso-
lution of failed Swedish banks.4 Banks will be required to pay the levy on an
annual basis at a rate of 0.018% of each institution’s liabilities, excluding
equity capital and certain subordinated debt, based on audited balance
sheets.5 Banks are not expected to make their first payments into the fund
until 2010 after the balance sheets are audited and the government has in-
jected an initial 15 billion kronor into the fund. Beginning in 2011, the bank
levy will increase to 0.036% of liabilities with the government planning to
introduce a weighted charge as well. Banks with riskier assets would pay a
higher percentage. Such a tax on bank liabilities may result, however, in
banks being double-charged on their liabilities if they have retail or wholesale
2 Global public goods can be defined as goods or services that are not provided by the market
because of market failure and which governments can therefore justify providing on efficiency
grounds in order to enhance economic and social outcomes. See generally Anthony B.
Atkinson, ‘Innovative Sources to Meet a Global Challenge’, in A.B. Atkinson (ed), New
Sources of Development Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 1–3.
3 See International Monetary Fund, ‘A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial
Sector’, Final Report for the G-20, IMF Final Report, http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/
pdf/062710b.pdf (visited 25 July 2010).
4 See Anders Borg, ‘Letter to G20 Finance Ministers’ (Ministry of Finance, Sweden, 2010, on
file with the author).
5 Ibid.
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deposits which often require reserve requirements at the central bank. The
Swedish levies are allocated to a stability fund managed by the Swedish
National Debt Office. The government plans to continue levying the fee
over a period of 15 years until the revenue generated reaches 2.5% of
Swedish gross domestic product (GDP).6
The Swedish stability fee serves as a model for other countries. The
Obama administration proposed a similar fee in March 2010 that it called
a ‘financial crisis responsibility fee’, to be imposed at a rate of 0.15% on the
largest US banks in order to repay US taxpayers for the costs of the US bank
bailout programme. Congress rejected the Obama bank tax in the Dodd-
Frank Act by requiring regulators to impose several different assessments
on the largest US banks and non-bank financial institutions to cover the
costs of the government’s expanded supervisory and resolution responsibil-
ities.7 Unlike other countries, which are adopting bank taxes designed to
curb future risk-taking, the US assessments are retrospective in effect be-
cause they are designed mainly to reimburse taxpayers for the direct costs of
the government’s bank bailouts and to establish a fund to support the future
resolution of financial institutions.
Germany, France and the UK have announced that they too will adopt a
levy or stability tax on bank balance sheets.8 The UK government proposed
in its 2010 budget a graduated tax on bank liabilities and equity where the
banking group’s aggregated liabilities exceed £20 million. The tax would be
based on all liabilities and equity excluding tier-1 capital, insured retail de-
posits, repurchase agreements on sovereign debt and retail insurance re-
serves.9 It would be imposed at a rate of 0.04% in 2011 increasing to
0.07% in 2012 with a reduced rate for longer maturity funding (i.e. greater
than 1 year) at 0.02% in 2011 rising to 0.035% in 2012.10 Significantly,
unlike the Swedish and US bank taxes, the German, French and UK taxes
are not considered to be insurance against bank failure and liability to pay
the tax does not indicate that the bank is too big to fail. The revenues
generated from the levy are not intended to pay for future bank bailouts
6 The Swedish government estimates 2.5% of GDP to be the cost to the Swedish economy of a
full-scale banking crisis. Ibid.
7 The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L.
111-203 (21 July 2010).
8 HM Treasury, ‘Bank Levy’, Press Release and Joint Statement of the UK, French and
German Governments, 4 June 2010 (announcing that the UK government would impose a
bank levy from 1 January 2011 and that the UK, French and German governments would
impose similar bank balance sheet levies). The UK levy would be based on the ‘consolidated
balance sheet’ of banking groups and the ‘aggregated subsidiary and branch balance sheets of
foreign banks and banking groups operating’ in the UK where these institutions have ‘relevant
aggregated liabilities’ of £20 million or more. See HM Treasury, Financial Times, 8 June
2010, 12.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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or indirect interventions. Instead, they are meant to be charges on
the broader economic and systemic risks posed by the banking sector.
The different design and objectives of these national bank taxes may affect
bank risk-taking differently across jurisdictions, which suggests that more
cross-border coordination is needed among national authorities to ensure
that these taxes achieve their objectives and are not circumvented through
arbitrage.
B. International initiatives
The Group of 20 (G-20) Heads of State requested the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to examine the desirability and feasibility of various
types of financial taxes and to report its conclusions to the G-20.11 The IMF
issued its report in June 2010 recommending that countries consider adopt-
ing two taxes: a ‘Financial Stability Contribution’ (FSC) and a ‘Financial
Activities Tax’ (FAT).12 The FSC is a balance sheet tax that would be based
on the bank’s total liabilities minus equity, insured deposits and insurance
policyholder reserves, with most of the proceeds going to a bank-resolution
fund. In contrast, the FAT would be levied on the profits and remuneration
of financial institutions and the proceeds would go to the general revenue
fund.13 The FSC is primarily designed as an insurance fund to pay retro-
spectively for the resolution or bailout of a large systemically important or
too-interconnected-to-fail bank or financial institution. In contrast, the FAT
would primarily be applied prospectively to deter excessive risk-taking.
The IMF’s recommended financial stability contribution is similar to the
financial stability tax discussed above that Sweden adopted in 2009 and
which was based on bank liabilities and equity. The G-20 and the
Financial Stability Board are considering proposals that would recommend
that countries adopt a balance sheet tax and levy similar to the IMF’s pro-
posals. These taxes, however, have met with resistance from some developed
countries and many developing countries because they might impose dispro-
portionate costs on countries whose economies rely more on bank finance.14
Moreover, some G-20 countries which had regulated their banks more strict-
ly before the crisis and hence did not provide direct bailouts to their banks
11 The G-20 Pittsburgh Communique´ stated that the IMF should ‘prepare a report for our next
meeting [June 2010] with regard to the range of options countries have adopted or are con-
sidering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward
paying for any burden associated with government interventions to repair the banking system.’
See G-20, ‘Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit’, 24–25 September 2009, para 16.
See also IMF Final Report, above n 3, at 1.
12 See IMF Final Report, above n 3.
13 Ibid, at 2–3.
14 Developing countries usually have under-developed capital markets and rely mainly on a
bank-led finance system. See Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch, Leading Issues in
Economic Development, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 138–46.
896 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(3)
 at U
n
iv
ersitaet Z
u
erich
 o
n
 D
ecem
b
er 1
0
, 2
0
1
2
h
ttp
://jiel.o
x
fo
rd
jo
u
rn
als.o
rg
/
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 fro
m
 
(i.e. Canada, China, India and Japan) have opposed a balance sheet tax and
have led opposition to the adoption of such a tax on an international basis.
Indeed, these countries influenced the text of the G-20 Toronto Summit
Communique´ to state that each country would be free to adopt whatever
tax measures it deemed appropriate for the needs of its economy and finan-
cial system. Another criticism of the bank balance sheet tax is that it will fail
to deter banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking and will not generate
adequate revenue to pay for a resolution fund because most banks will avoid
the tax by shifting risky assets and liabilities off balance sheet to affiliates and
related entities located outside the taxing jurisdiction. These weaknesses of
the proposed bank balance sheet tax suggest that policy-makers should con-
sider the merits of a FTT that would be applied by national governments
and collected by banks and dealers with the support of transnational clearing
and settlement houses.
III. FTTS
The recent crisis has raised questions about the possibility of a Tobin or
transactions tax to restrain the explosive growth of financial transactions in
recent years. In considering such a tax, it should be borne in mind that most
countries do not impose a sale or value-added tax on financial services trans-
actions.15 The idea behind a FTT has been attributed to Nobel Laureate
James Tobin who proposed a CTT in the 1970s primarily to limit the desta-
bilizing influence of the growing volume of very short-term foreign exchange
transactions and to enhance control over the financial aspects of
macro-economic policy.16 Since Tobin’s original proposal, the idea of a
FTT has been developed by economists and civil society groups as a possible
source of revenue to finance global development objectives.17 Recently, the
global financial crisis has brought the issue back on the agenda with the
G-20’s efforts to rebuild the financial architecture. Unlike the pre-crisis lit-
erature, proposals for a FTT have gained considerable traction, both as a
15 The European Commission is examining an EU financial transaction tax, while the European
Parliament has generally endorsed the broad outlines of a tax and the need for EU institutions
to develop a unified position on the issue. Commission of the European Communities,
‘Innovative Financing at a Global Level’, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC
(2010) 409, 1 April 2010 and European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution to Wind-Up
the Debate by the Commission Pursuant to Rule 110 (2) of the Rules of Procedure on
Financial Transaction Taxes – Making Them Work’, B7 0000/2009, 8 January 2010.
16 See James Tobin, ‘A Proposal for International Monetary Reform’, 4 Eastern Economic
Journal 153 (1978), at 154. See also James Tobin, The New Economics One Decade Older,
The Eliot Janeway Lectures on Historical Economics in Honour of Joseph Schumpeter (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974).
17 Mahbub ul Haq, Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg (eds), The Tobin Tax: Coping with Financial
Volatility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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financial stability instrument and as a way to pay for global public goods,
such as the UN MDGs and climate-change policies.
This section suggests that the effectiveness and feasibility of a FTT will
depend on how well it satisfies the following criteria: (i) achieves a balance of
economic benefits in terms of risk mitigation that does not significantly dis-
tort the market nor undermine liquidity; (ii) generates adequate revenue to
pay for public goods; (iii) is collected and monitored through clearing and
settlement infrastructure subject to central bank oversight; and (iv) complies
with applicable international law.
A. The economic rationale
In considering the merits of a FTT, one should bear in mind that the object
of economic activity is to produce goods and services. Financial transactions
are the means by which the production of goods and services is funded. In
the 1960s, international trade grew by 8.2% a year, which, together with
long-term investment flows, was financed by foreign exchange transactions
that were roughly double the value of the trade deals themselves.18 In recent
years, however, the volume and value of transactions have grown much more
rapidly than the underlying production and trade. Between 2000 and 2007,
while growth in international trade slowed to just 5.8% per year, the value of
foreign exchange transactions rose to more than 80 times the value of the
underlying trade and long-term investment.19
Similarly, the growth of derivatives markets and in particular of credit
default swaps (CDSs) has grown dramatically with the total notional value
of such contracts rising from just over $1 trillion in 1986 to around $516
trillion in 2007.20 The CDS market was at the centre of the financial distress
in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed. The collapse of
Lehman Brothers and its aftermath demonstrates that the risk to the econ-
omy as a whole was not just a function of complexity and the interconnect-
edness of transactions, but also of the sheer size of the transactions
themselves, relative to the underlying trade or loans on which they were
written. For example, Lehman’s over-the-counter (OTC) CDS book had a
notional value of $72 billion, yet Lehman’s net exposure to OTC credit
default contracts is estimated to have been only about $5.2 billion.21
18 See Kern Alexander, John Eatwell, Avinash Persaud and Robert Reoch, ‘Crisis Management,
Burden Sharing, and Solidarity Mechanisms in the EU’ IP/A/ECON/FWC/2010, Report to
the European Parliament, 2010, at 31–33.
19 Ibid.
20 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics at end-June
2008’, http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm (visited 25 July 2010).
21 The Bank for International Settlements Estimated in June 2008 that the value of CDSs
outstanding in major financial markets was $57.3 trillion. Ibid. In late 2008, the US
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation revealed that the value of CDS transactions
was ten times greater than the value of the underlying risk being insured. See Depository
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The ever-growing amount of financial transactions that are based upon a
relatively small amount of underlying assets has led some to suggest that
policy-makers should give serious consideration to a FTT.22 The focus on
transaction taxes reflects that the proliferation of financial transactions them-
selves has become a concern of regulators and that a significant portion of
transactions has been characterized as ‘socially useless’.23 The excessive
growth of financial transactions imposes a risk on society as a whole.
Those who impose that risk should pay for it. If they do not, then risk is
mis-priced. This raises an important question: if financial transactions have
grown too large and pose serious risks to financial stability, can a FTT
reduce the value and volume of transactions to a more efficient level without
undermining liquidity and financial development?
Academic opinion is strongly divided over what utility FTTs have in curb-
ing excessive risk-taking and generating sustainable sources of revenue.
Proponents of FTTs view financial markets as characterized by excessive
trading activity and short-term speculation, and consider that such specula-
tion generates volatility not only in short-term asset prices, but also in
long-term asset prices marked by persistent and dramatic departures from
equilibrium.24 Keynes observed that this could lead to the ‘predominance of
speculation over enterprise’ with the result that ‘enterprise becomes the
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation’.25 Accordingly, a tax on transactions
in securities and other financial instruments would increase the cost of
speculative trading, especially for trades with shorter durations, and this
would have a stabilizing effect on asset prices. Moreover, the tax would
generate revenue needed to assist governments with fiscal consolidation, es-
pecially during times of crisis.
Trust and Clearing Corporation, ‘Trade Information Warehouse Data’, http://dtcc.com/prod-
ucts/derivserv/data_table_i.php (visited 25 July 2010).
22 Adair Turner, ‘What Do Banks Do, What Should They Do and What Public Policies are
Needed to Ensure Best Results’, March 2010, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/at_
17mar10.pdf (visited 25 July 2010).
23 Ibid, at 1.
24 Lawrence H. Summers and Victoria P. Summers, ‘When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A
Cautious Case for a Securities Transaction Tax’, 3 Journal of Financial Services Research 261
(1989); Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Using Tax Policy to Curb Short-Term Trading’, 3 Journal of
Financial Services Research 101 (1989); J. Bradford de Long, Andrei Sheleifer, Lawrence
H. Summers, and Robert J. Waldmann, ‘Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and
Destabilizing Rational Speculation’, 45(2) The Journal of Finance 379 (1990); and
Stephan Schulmeister, ‘A General Financial Transaction Tax: A Short Cut of the Pros,
Cons and a Proposal’, http://www.makefinancework.org/IMG/pdf/schulmeister_eng.pdf (vis-
ited 25 July 2010).
25 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan,
1936) 158–59. Keynes also observed that to limit excessive speculation on the stock exchange
‘a substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most serviceable
reform available’. Ibid, at 160.
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Opponents of transaction taxes generally believe that a high number
of transactions—both short- and long-term—are necessary for the price
discovery process to work and for the efficient distribution of risk.
More transactions lead to a smoothing in asset-price movements towards
equilibrium,26 and short-term trading is necessary to allow effective hedging
and should not, therefore, be limited. Any increase in transaction costs (i.e. a
tax) would limit parties’ ability to hedge risk, thus reducing liquidity and
increasing short-term volatility of asset prices. An alternative, and fundamen-
tally contradictory point, is that globalized and liberalized financial markets
make it very difficult to implement a FTT and will result in evasion and
circumvention of the FTT, thereby substantially reducing its effectiveness
and its revenue-raising capacity.
B. Global public goods
The crisis has also made it extremely difficult for developed countries to
honour their pledges taken at the Gleneagles G7 Summit in 2005 to increase
their financial support for global public goods and in particular to achieve
the UN MDGs.27 At the Gleneagles Summit, the G7 Heads of State pro-
mised increased financial support for poverty reduction in the world’s poor-
est countries and to raise Official Development Assistance to 0.7% of gross
national product. These financial commitments, however, have not been
met. The World Bank has estimated that since 2005 the resource gap be-
tween the financial commitments made by developed countries and their
actual expenditures and support levels for global public goods grew substan-
tially and would reach an estimated range of between US$324 and 336
billion per year sometime between 2012 and 2017.28 Even if the global
economy improves, the resource gap for developed countries will remain
substantial, thus making it difficult for developed countries to fulfil their
financial commitments to achieve the MDGs. Consequently, developed
countries are considering alternative and innovative sources of finance to
pay for their MDG commitments and other global public goods.
26 Karl F. Habermeier, Andrei A. Kirilenko, ‘Securities Transaction Taxes and Financial
Markets’, 50 IMF Staff Papers 165 (special issue), 2003. See also John Grahl and Photis
Lysandrou, ‘Sand in the Wheels or Spanner in the Works? The Tobin Tax and Global
Finance’, 27(4) Cambridge Journal of Economics 597 (2003).
27 UN General Assembly Resolution, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’, A/Res/55/2,
18 September 2000. The MDGs consist of eight specific goals: (i) eradicating extreme pov-
erty; (ii) achieving universal primary education; (iii) promoting gender equality and empower-
ing women; (iv) reducing child mortality; (v) improving maternal health; (vi) combating HIV/
AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (vii) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (viii) de-
veloping a global partnership for development.
28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Economic Outlook No 86’,
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34109_20347538_1_1_1_37443,00.html
(visited 25 July 2010).
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IV. CTT
The foreign exchange market (FX market) is crucial for the functioning of
the global financial system because it is the largest and most liquid of the
asset class markets. In the post-crisis environment, it has taken on an even
greater significance because of the recognized importance of liquidity to the
successful operation of the global financial system. Despite the recent eco-
nomic downturn and associated financial distress in most countries, the aver-
age daily turnover in the global foreign exchange market has increased
dramatically from just over US$3 trillion a day in 2007 to US$4 trillion a
day in 2010 (Fig. 1).29 The vast majority of the market (about 90%) con-
sists of spot transactions, outright forwards and forex swaps, while
non-traditional foreign exchange derivatives and other products (i.e. cur-
rency swaps and options) comprise about 10% of the market (Fig. 1).
Most of these trades can be settled within 7 days, which suggests that they
are predominantly speculative and have little connection to underlying trade.
Although foreign exchange markets generally operated efficiently in the
$0
$1
$2
$3
$4
1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Trading by Instruments in trillions of US dollars
Currency swaps
Options and 
other products
Outright forwards
Spot transactions
Foreign-exchange 
swaps
Figure 1. Global foreign exchange market. Source: BIS.
29 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Triennial Central Bank Survey for Foreign Exchange and
Derivatives Market Activity in April 2010 – Preliminary Global Results, September 2010, at
3. Although trading volumes dropped in 2008–09 in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’
collapse, daily volumes are now expected to grow further because of increased investment in
emerging economies and commodity-producing countries and advances in computer trading
systems.
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recent crisis, there were considerable disruptions to the foreign exchange
swap market before and after the Lehman Brothers’ collapse.30
Traditionally, most of these transactions were carried out by interbank deal-
ers—the largest investment banks and their dealers—but in 2010 the pro-
portion of transactions carried out by interbank dealers dropped to 39%
while the proportion of transactions carried out by ‘other financial institu-
tions’, such as mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, hedge
funds and central banks, rose significantly to 42%. A much smaller propor-
tion of trades (13%) were carried out by nonfinancial businesses, such as
manufacturing and airline companies.31
A CTT could work as follows: it would be assessed on individual foreign
exchange transactions by interbank dealers and other financial intermediaries
in the foreign exchange market and monitored and possibly collected by the
main international foreign exchange settlement house, the Continuous Link
Settlement Bank (CLS Bank),32 with support from central banks through
their real-time gross-settlement systems. National authorities could then col-
lect the tax from the CLS Bank in cooperation with central banks and with
access to information provided by data cooperatives such as the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT).33 The finan-
cial intermediaries and dealers would pay the tax and if there were no inter-
mediary in the process (e.g. intra-group payments within a corporate group)
then the taxpayer would become liable itself (i.e. the holding company).
A country could apply the CTT on all wholesale transactions conducted
by intermediaries (banks and other brokers) based within that country, in-
dependently of where the transactions are negotiated, the location of trans-
feror or transferee or the place of settlement.
The CTT is similar to the Tobin Tax, but is different in important re-
spects: the Tobin tax was intended to slow the flow of cross-border capital
(‘throw sand in the wheels’) to enhance the ability of national authorities to
30 See N. Baba and F. Packer, ‘From Turmoil to Crisis: Dislocations in the FX Swap Market
Before and After the Failure of Lehman Brothers’, BIS Working Papers No 285, July 2009.
31 See Triennial Central Bank Survey, above n 29, at 3.
32 The Continuous Link Settlement System (CLS) and the Continuous Link Settlement Bank
International (CLS Bank) were established in 2002 by the 17 leading central banks, which
issue the world’s reserve currencies and a group of leading banks and financial institutions.
The CLS Bank holds the deposits of its member banks denominated in the currencies of its
participating central banks in the CLS system so that if one member bank cannot fulfil its
counterparty obligation to another CLS member, then the CLS Bank can draw on the de-
faulting member’s relevant currency deposit to cover the obligation owed to the
non-defaulting CLS member. In 2009, the CLS Bank settled approximately 55% of the
value of foreign exchange transactions. The other main settlement method is traditional cor-
respondent banking which settles about 32% of the value of forex transactions.
33 SWIFT operates a worldwide voluntary financial messaging network which exchanges infor-
mation between banks and other financial institutions in order to facilitate interbank pay-
ments, but it does not clear and settle payments and therefore could not collect or deduct tax
on transactions. See http://www.swift.com (visited 25 July 2010).
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conduct monetary policy and to prevent an exchange-rate crisis. This meant
that the Tobin Tax had to be at a high enough rate (0.50 or 1.0%) to change
investor behaviour, which led to the criticism that under certain circum-
stances it would significantly limit liquidity in the market, which could ex-
acerbate a crisis.34 Instead, a CTT could be assessed at a low enough rate
(0.01%–1 basis point or 0.005%–one-half a basis point) so as not to limit
liquidity unduly, while deterring only those transactions with such low
spreads (less than 0.01 or 0.005%) that it would not have an appreciable
effect on liquidity nor on underlying economic activity.
A. How high should the CTT rate be?
In considering the rate at which the tax should be levied, it will be necessary
to consider two factors: (i) how much the market will decline given the tax
rate charged, and (ii) the market’s capacity to pay the tax without unduly
limiting liquidity. Schmidt estimates a fall in volume of transactions of 14% if
the rate of one-half of a basis point (0.005%) is levied.35 The market’s cap-
acity to pay the tax will depend in part on the depth of liquidity in the
market and ability of dealers and clients to circumvent and avoid the tax.
Some studies suggest significant ‘market dampening’ and ‘leakage’ would
lead to a market reduction of 25%.36
Proponents of the CTT estimate that a low tax rate can generate substan-
tial revenue even if only applied to a few reserve currencies (sterling and
euro).37 The most comprehensive and realistic estimates of how much
money a CTT can raise across the major currencies are from Schmidt and
Baker.38 Based on 2007 data, Schmidt estimates that a coordinated CTT
levied at 0.005% (one-half a basis point) applied to the leading reserve
currencies would yield US$ 33.41 billion a year.39 In contrast, a coordinated
CTT at the same rate on all the major currencies except the dollar would
yield US$21.24 billion a year, and a coordinated tax on only the euro and
sterling would yield US$16.52 billion a year. His estimates are more realistic
34 Grahl and Lysandrou, above n 26, at 598–600.
35 Rodney Schmidt, The Currency Transaction Tax: Rate and Revenue Estimates (Toronto: United
Nations/North-South Institute, 2008) 14.
36 Dean Baker, ‘The Benefits of a Financial Transaction Tax’, http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/financial-transactions-tax-2008-12.pdf (visited 25 July 2010).
37 See Machiko Nissanke, ‘The Tobin Tax for Development Finance’ in Atkinson (ed), above
n 2, at 72; see also Heikki Patomaki and Katarina Sehm-Patomaki, The Tobin Tax: How to
Make it Real (Helsinki: The Network Institute for Global Democratisation, 1999).
38 See Schmidt, above n 35, at 14–17, and Baker, above n 36.
39 Schmidt’s estimates for a CTT on the US dollar as one leg against all other currencies
amounted to: US$28.8 billion, while a CTT on the euro alone as one leg against all other
currencies would yield US$12.29 billion, and similarly on the yen alone against all other
currencies would yield US$5.59 billion, and sterling alone against all other currencies
would yield US$4.98 billion. Ibid.
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and much lower than what other CTT proponents had estimated because
he gives more weight to market dampening as a result of the tax.40 Most of
the volume reductions that result from the tax derive from the loss of
short-term trading, such as algorithmic trading, that responds to very
small spreads of less than one basis point which would be smaller than the
estimated tax. On the other hand, his revenue estimates can be considered
more optimistic because he minimizes the risk of avoidance and circumven-
tion because of the expected effect of centralized settlement in the CLS Bank
system which would make it very difficult to avoid paying the tax.41
Schmidt’s higher estimates should be contrasted with those of other CTT
and FTT advocates who adopt similar methodologies but give more weight
to avoidance and circumvention. For instance, Baker estimated a CTT yield
of only US$7.8 billion that took into account a higher level of market re-
duction of 25% based on a tax rate of 0.01% (one basis point).42 Nissanke
uses BIS data from 2001 to estimate that a global CTT at a rate of 0.02%
applied to wholesale transactions would yield between US$30 and US$35
billion while at a rate of 0.01%, it would yield between US$17 and US$31
billion a year.43 Schmidt’s estimate of $33.41 billion a year appears to be a
realistic assessment of the capacity of the CTT to raise revenue based on the
depth and liquidity of the foreign exchange markets and the institutional
consolidation that is occurring in centralized settlement of foreign exchange
transactions.44
In addition, the adoption of a CTT, and its rate, would have important
implications for certain international financial centres, such as the UK’s City
of London which serves as the world’s leading foreign exchange trading
centre, with nearly 36.7% of the value of foreign exchange transactions
taking place each day.45 UK policy-makers would understandably be con-
cerned that such a tax might cause the migration of much of this business to
other jurisdictions. At a 0.005% rate, however, it is difficult to show that a
UK CTT of 0.005%—equivalent to a £500 charge for a £10 million trans-
action—would undermine London’s status as the world’s leading centre for
foreign exchange trading.
40 For example, this should be compared with the much higher estimate of US$176 billion a
year. J. Frankel ‘How Well Do Markets Work: Might a Tobin Tax Help?’ in Haq et al., above
n 17, at 41–82.
41 In light of the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey 2010 survey, these estimates are rather
cautious because they are based on average daily foreign exchange turnover of US$3 trillion a
day, and not on the 2010 survey’s much higher turnover of US$4 trillion a day.
42 See Baker, above n 36.
43 See Nissanke above n 37.
44 See Schmidt, above n 35.
45 London is followed by the USA (18%), Japan (6.2%), Singapore (5.3%), Switzerland (5.2%),
Hong Kong (4.7%), Australia (3.8%), France (3.0%), Denmark (2.4%), Germany (2.1%).
Triennial Central Bank Survey, above n 29, at 2.
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B. Technical feasibility and incidence
In considering the implementation and incidence of CTT, previous studies
support the viability of administering such a tax in modern foreign exchange
settlement systems.46 The CLS Bank, along with the CLS infrastructure,
could permit CTTs to be imposed at a relatively low level, which has little
effect on the relative costs of the transaction. For the CLS Bank to collect
the tax, it would need the support of participating central banks, which issue
the leading reserve currencies, to monitor wholesale gross-currency transac-
tions through their real-time gross-settlement (RTGS) payment systems.
Some central bankers, however, might emphasize that there is nothing in
their mandate that would authorize them to support the CLS Bank in col-
lecting a CTT. Understandably, central bankers charged with financial sta-
bility are very concerned about undermining market stability, and would
therefore be concerned about any process that drove participants away
from well-established and well-run existing markets, which might hinder
liquidity and significantly raise transaction costs. This point is reinforced
by the belief that the CLS Bank had performed well during the crisis and
especially during the week in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers col-
lapsed when it settled effectively $26.3 trillion in foreign exchange payments
despite disruptions in the foreign exchange swap market. Although central
banks would probably like to see more use of the CLS Bank in settling forex
transactions, because of the high transparency of the transactions and
reduced settlement risk, they might have concerns with it collecting a
CTT because this might drive transactions away from the CLS System,
thereby increasing settlement risk.
Nevertheless, in an age when authorities have effectively nationalized the
bulk of banking systems and where governments and central banks have
purchased substantial quantities of hard to value private instruments, if regu-
lators believe using a central settlement system promotes financial stability,
then using such a system can be made mandatory for instruments to be
legally valid or there could be higher capital-adequacy requirements for
those not settling their trades in the central settlement system because, by
settling outside the system, they are taking greater risks and possibly increas-
ing systemic risk.
On the other hand, the incidence of the tax may create private costs that
offset the social benefits from requiring the trade to be settled in a particular
system. Foreign exchange trade encompasses a huge amount of different
commercial activities with differing motivations. While foreign exchange
speculation is one type of commercial activity taking place on the market,
a large number of trade, investment, savings and pensions activities—
conducted by individuals and business entities at the retail and wholesale
46 See Schmidt, above n 35, at 4.
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levels—involve the foreign exchange markets. As such, a large proportion of
‘activity’ on the foreign exchange market is already taxed in numerous ways.
Also, foreign exchange trading supports international trade in goods and
services and a tax on currency transactions might hinder international
trade itself by increasing the cost of trade finance, especially for developing
countries. It is uncertain whether it is desirable to try and exclude from the
CTT those transactions that primarily support international trade because it
might be difficult to differentiate between foreign exchange speculation and
hedging transactions and currency transactions that are incidental to inter-
national trade. On the other hand, the size of the levy being proposed is
unlikely to make any material difference to a corporate or real goods trade
transaction. It may be useful to note that legal and banking fees on many of
these transactions often amount to well in excess of 1.0% or 100 basis
points. In large, cross-border corporate finance transactions, banks charge
advisory fees, arrangement fees and commitment fees, and each of these is a
large multiple of a basis point. In trade finance transactions, banking fees are
similar, amounting to many multiples of a basis point.
Some critics, however, are sceptical that the tax would have a ‘negligible
effect’. While the proposed size of the levy (0.005% or 0.5 basis points)
appears very low, it is not low relative to the spreads for the most liquid
exchange rates in the foreign exchange market such as euro/$, £/$, Sfr/$ and
$/¥. In times of low volatility, spreads for these currencies were reported to
stand at around one basis point, in which case a 0.5 basis point levy would
be very significant. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the spread is not a
reflection of trading profitability, but reflects the price of liquidity. Banks
make profit from trading foreign exchange partly by charging for this liquid-
ity, but primarily by following trends in the market place and in their cus-
tomers’ business.
Regarding the burden of the tax, it should be observed that in terms of
information the foreign exchange market is primarily a wholesale market.
Retail transactions are a very small proportion of total transactions. The
burden of the tax will fall on those carrying out thousands of transactions
over short periods of time—this is decidedly not retail, it is wholesale and
is primarily algorithmic trading. For instance, a pension fund investor will
execute transactions in a long-term fund a few times a year, while a hedge
fund would do so hundreds of times.
V. FTT
A transaction tax could be applied to a broader range of financial assets—
equities, bonds, swaps, options and an array of derivative instruments. Many
developed and developing countries, such as Brazil and Japan, already
impose broad-based taxes on futures and derivatives transactions and
stocks and bonds, and some countries such as the UK have narrower
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taxes on equity shares traded on an exchange.47 A broader FTT could po-
tentially raise substantial sums to defray the costs of financial crises and
reduce the growing public resource gaps identified by international organ-
izations. A broader FTT could be based on most instruments in OTC mar-
kets, such as interest rate swaps and currency swaps and options, and certain
exchange-traded derivatives and futures.48
Although the tax could be levied at a rate similar to the CTT, it could be
applied at different rates to reflect different risks posed by the instruments
and different liquidity requirements in the markets in which the instruments
trade. Dealing and trading in instruments outside the forex markets often
involves a broader range of players located in multiple jurisdictions who use
different clearing and settlement institutions and are exposed to different
counterparty and market risks. To this end, Spahn has proposed that differ-
ent tax rates apply to different counterparties (regulated banks, other finan-
cial institutions and private capital and non-financial corporations and public
institutions) depending on their size and the systemic risk that they pose.49
This proposal assumes that some categories of counterparty (e.g. hedge
funds) or transactions (e.g. certain derivative products) are more prone to
speculative trading than others. Such a multi-tiered tax regime should aim to
identify the desirable level of reduction in trading activities, which should be
large enough to eliminate short-term speculative trading, but not so large as
to limit unduly or hamper the normal functioning of markets.
Econometric analysis has estimated how much a broad FTT can raise
across a wide number of financial instruments (including bonds, exchange-
traded, centrally cleared and OTC derivatives).50 For instance, Schulmeister
incorporates conservative parameters for market dampening, avoidance and
circumvention. Although his estimates are rather cautious, they provide
probably the most accurate estimate to date of the market impact of a
FTT at tax rates of 0.5, 0.1 or 0.01%. Based on his methodology, if the
lowest tax rate of 0.01% is applied to all exchange-traded and OTC deriva-
tives, the estimated revenue would be between $100 and $120 billion a
year.51 The broader FTT, unlike the CTT, would generate substantially
higher revenue and would achieve regulatory objectives because it would
47 See IMF Final Report, above n 12, Appendix 5.
48 The average daily value of the global OTC derivatives market is approximately US$24 trillion
per year (including credit default swaps, commodity contracts, equity derivatives, interest rate
contracts, and FX contracts). Alexander et al., above n 18, at 52.
49 Paul B. Spahn, ‘On the Feasibility of a Tax on Foreign Exchange Transactions’, http://www.
wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/profs/spahn/tobintax/Tobintax.pdf (visited 25 July 2010).
50 Stephan Schulmeister, ‘A General Financial Transaction Tax: A Short Cut of the Pros, Cons
and a Proposal’, WIFO Working Papers No 344, 2009.
51 Schulmeister’s parameters show that the lower tax rate of 0.01% would generate more rev-
enue in absolute terms than the higher tax rates of 0.10 and 0.50% largely because of market
dampening at the higher rates.
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be focused mainly on instruments with shorter term positions that consist of
higher levels of leverage which pose greater systemic risk.
Recent regulatory initiatives in Europe and the USA will require most
OTC derivatives and futures contracts to be traded and cleared on an orga-
nized exchange and/or clearing house. It would be advantageous to imple-
ment a FTT through centralized clearing and settlement structures. The
trend towards centralized clearing and settlement of derivatives and foreign
exchange transactions has made it much more feasible to implement a FTT
on a global basis. Clearing houses already have sophisticated reporting pro-
cesses for withholding tariffs and other charges and costs for dealers and
other users and maintain up-to-date data on all cleared transactions.52
This type of centralized clearing and settlement network can provide vital
information for use in assessing and reporting the applicable amount of tax
owed for a FTT. Moreover, future regulatory reforms will provide incentives
such as lower capital charges for intermediaries to clear their derivatives
trades through clearing houses and therefore a small transaction tax of
0.01% (one basis point) or 0.005% (one-half of one basis point) would be
a small price to pay for the cost savings and reduced risk of clearing trades
through clearing houses.
For both the FTT and CTT, an international mechanism for distribution
of the proceeds will have to be agreed by the participating states. Once
collected, the revenue could be distributed first to the national authorities
of the jurisdiction where the market participants paid the tax. These govern-
ments might then have an obligation to use a pre-agreed portion of the
revenue for domestic regulatory programmes, or to reimburse the govern-
ment for direct assistance to the financial sector. They would then distribute
a pre-agreed portion of the revenue to international aid organizations to be
used to promote the UN MDGs and reduce existing official sector resource
gaps in support of overseas development programmes. In addition, some of
the revenue could be designated for a global solidarity fund to pay for cli-
mate change initiatives and provide other global public goods. In this way,
financial tax revenue could be used both to achieve regulatory objectives and
provide global public goods.
VI. THE FTT/CTT AND WTO OBLIGATIONS
Foreign exchange and OTC market activity has become much more global
with the proportion of cross-border transactions increasing to 65% in 2010
from 62% in 2007.53 The significant increase in cross-border trading activity
52 Robert Barnes, ‘Counterparty Clearing House User Choice: An Evolving European
Landscape’, http://www.oxera.com/cmsDocuments/Agenda_March%2010/Counterparty%20
clearing%20house%20user%20choice.pdf (visited 25 July 2010).
53 BIS Triennial 2010 Survey, above n 29, at 4.
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in the financial markets raises some important issues regarding how a CTT
or a FTT may impinge on World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments.
The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and its Annex
on Financial Services provide the international legal framework for the regu-
lation of cross-border trade in financial services. Although the jurisdictional
scope of the GATS does not cover the liberalization of cross-border capital
flows, it does cover cross-border money transfers or payments that are ne-
cessary for Members to fulfil their specific commitments on market access
and national treatment.
Under Article XI(1) of the GATS, a Member may not restrict ‘interna-
tional transfers and payments for current transactions relating to its specific
commitments.’ In other words, restrictions on capital flows or payments that
are necessary to make a payment for cross-border trade in a services sector
or subsector that is subject to a GATS market access or national treatment
commitment is not permitted under the GATS. Article XI provides:
Article XI: Payments and Transfers
1. Except under the circumstances envisaged in Article XII, a Member
shall not apply restrictions on international transfers and payments for
current transactions relating to its specific commitments.
Significantly, this prohibition on restrictions on international transfers and
payments relates only to specific commitments made by WTO Members to
liberalize their services sectors. For instance, where a Member has not made
a liberalization commitment for a particular services sector, the Article XI
prohibition would not apply. States have discretion through the WTO nego-
tiation process to liberalize their services sectors on a sector-by-sector basis.
Regarding financial services, most developed countries adopted in 1997 the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services that sets out a blue-
print for making liberalization commitments in financial services. The
Understanding allows its 31 signatory members (counting the EU as one)
to opt for a higher and more robust set of market-access and national treat-
ment commitments.
The relevance of Article XI for the analysis of the CTT and FTT is that
most developed countries and some developing countries that are WTO
Members (i.e. the USA, the EU, Japan and some sub-Saharan African coun-
tries) have made substantial market-access commitments in many of their
services sectors, thereby incurring an obligation under Article XI(1) not to
impose any restrictions (including taxes or charges) on ‘international transfers
and payments’ that relate to the provision of these cross-border services
(including financial services). Although it is not clear whether the CTT
and FTT are discriminatory measures under WTO jurisprudence, they
could be interpreted as restrictions on cross-border transfers and payments
related to specific commitments in violation of a Member’s market access
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commitments under Article XVI GATS. The Annex on Financial Services,
however, permits Members to depart from their GATS liberalization com-
mitments (including the Article XI obligation not to impose restrictions on
international transfers and payments) by adopting measures for a prudential
reason that protect investors, depositors, policyholders or to maintain the
stability and integrity of the financial system.54 This is known as the ‘pru-
dential carve-out’ and it is intended to provide member governments discre-
tion to adopt measures for a prudential reason that may have the effect of
departing from their liberalization commitments in services sectors.
The FTT and CTT would arguably qualify for the ‘prudential carve-out’
because they can potentially be designed to achieve prudential regulatory
objectives in the form of curbing excessive risk-taking, providing funds for
bank resolution programmes and paying for the social costs of financial
crises. However, if the FTTs or CTTs are designed largely to raise revenue
to pay for global public goods, such as the UN MDGs and climate-change
measures, unrelated to regulatory objectives, they will have difficulty with-
standing a legal challenge by a WTO Member under Article XI of the
GATS.55
VII. CONCLUSION
The article examines the advantages and disadvantages of several types of
financial taxes, including a bank balance sheet tax, a CTT and a broader
FTT. The article suggests that FTTs, especially those applied to currency
transactions and exchange-traded and OTC derivatives, could serve regula-
tory objectives while raising sustainable revenue to assist governments in
paying for the social costs of financial crises and providing global public
goods. Nevertheless, financial policy-makers should consider what type of
financial tax is most appropriate for their jurisdictions and then adopt inter-
national principles with other national authorities to govern their implemen-
tation in order to minimize arbitrage and circumvention.
54 Annex on Financial Services, Article 2(a). It states in relevant part: ‘Notwithstanding any
other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for
prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, or
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the
integrity and stability of the financial system.’
55 Cf. also on prudential carve out in GATS papers by Cottier and Krajewsky, in this issue at
817–835.
910 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(3)
 at U
n
iv
ersitaet Z
u
erich
 o
n
 D
ecem
b
er 1
0
, 2
0
1
2
h
ttp
://jiel.o
x
fo
rd
jo
u
rn
als.o
rg
/
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 fro
m
 
